🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in file paths#40
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in file paths#40bitcoiner-dev wants to merge 1 commit into
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This commit addresses a critical path traversal vulnerability caused by passing unsanitized user inputs (e.g., profile and snapshot names) directly to `PathBuf::join`. This could allow malicious users to write or overwrite arbitrary files outside the intended directory. Changes: - Added `crate::utils::validate_file_name` to ensure strictly alphanumeric, underscore, and dash characters. - Applied validation to `idempotency_store_path` in `src/main.rs`. - Applied validation to `profile_path` and `snapshot_dir` in `src/paths.rs`. - Applied validation to Snapshot Save and Restore commands in `src/commands/snapshot.rs`. - Logged the learning in `.jules/sentinel.md`. Co-authored-by: bitcoiner-dev <75873427+bitcoiner-dev@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The application passed unsanitized user inputs (like profile names and snapshot names) to
PathBuf::join, which is vulnerable to directory traversal (e.g.,../) and absolute path replacement (e.g.,/etc/passwd).🎯 Impact: Local attackers or malicious scripts could overwrite arbitrary files or escalate privileges by writing content to unintended locations outside the app's directory.
🔧 Fix: Implemented
validate_file_nameinsrc/utils.rsto enforce an allowlist of characters (alphanumeric, underscores, and dashes), and applied it before any vulnerablePath::joinoperations.✅ Verification: Ran
cargo test --bin zinc-cliand manually verified syntactic validity. Documented learning in.jules/sentinel.md.PR created automatically by Jules for task 16892089233914937627 started by @bitcoiner-dev