🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in snapshot names#45
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in snapshot names#45bitcoiner-dev wants to merge 1 commit into
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The snapshot `Save` and `Restore` commands accepted a user-provided `name` argument and passed it directly to `snap_dir.join(format!("{name}.json"))`. Because `Path::join` handles relative paths (e.g., `../`) and replaces the entire path if passed an absolute path, an attacker or user could overwrite or read arbitrary files by passing a malicious path as the `name` argument.
🎯 Impact: Exploiting this allows arbitrary path traversal which could read sensitive local JSON files, overwrite security configurations, or overwrite binary files leading to localized privilege escalation.
🔧 Fix: Implemented an explicit allowlist `validate_file_name` in `src/utils.rs` to enforce that snapshot file names strictly consist of alphanumeric characters, dashes, and underscores. Applied this validation before file creation in `src/commands/snapshot.rs`.
✅ Verification: Ran `cargo test` successfully and verified that attempting to use `../` or `/absolute/paths` in names now safely errors out.
Co-authored-by: bitcoiner-dev <75873427+bitcoiner-dev@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The snapshot
SaveandRestorecommands accepted a user-providednameargument and passed it directly tosnap_dir.join(format!("{name}.json")). BecausePath::joinhandles relative paths (e.g.,../) and replaces the entire path if passed an absolute path, an attacker or user could overwrite or read arbitrary files by passing a malicious path as thenameargument.🎯 Impact: Exploiting this allows arbitrary path traversal which could read sensitive local JSON files, overwrite security configurations, or overwrite binary files leading to localized privilege escalation.
🔧 Fix: Implemented an explicit allowlist
validate_file_nameinsrc/utils.rsto enforce that snapshot file names strictly consist of alphanumeric characters, dashes, and underscores. Applied this validation before file creation insrc/commands/snapshot.rs.✅ Verification: Ran
cargo testsuccessfully and verified that attempting to use../or/absolute/pathsin names now safely errors out.PR created automatically by Jules for task 4233572097264855345 started by @bitcoiner-dev